the British ships were not used, but our large cargo ships were converted into troop-carrying vessels, and great aid was rendered by the navy which put at the army's disposal cruisers and battleships, so that the army was brought back home even more rapidly than it was taken to France.

From the files of the United States Navy the table included in Chapter XXI has been taken showing the total number of United States troops carried overseas and the nationality of the ships which transported them.

CHAPTER XXVI

COAL AND GASOLENE HELP TO WIN THE WAR

ON

NE of the most important questions before the country during the progress of the war was the question of fuel. The great dependence of almost all forms of industry upon the supply of coal made it absolutely essential that the coal production in our country should be increased during the war, and that so far as possible there should be economy in its use. Before the war the Bureau of Mines had studied the problem, and issued many reports tending to solve many of the difficulties met with in the burning of coal. One of its conclusions was that in many localities the substitution of coke for anthracite coal was desirable on the score of economy and cleanliness. The Council of Defense appointed a committee on coal production during the war, and the following statement as to its work was issued in the middle of June:

"The primary purpose of the Committee on Coal Production as outlined when it was created is to increase coal production so that an adequate supply will be available. How well it has accomplished this purpose is shown by the following figures. Bituminous coal loaded at the mines in the United States for rail movement amounted in May to nearly 40,000,000 tons, or over seven million tons more than was loaded in May a year ago, and four million tons more than in April of this year. Anthracite shipments in May were over 1,300,000 tons more than for May a year ago. This mine activity probably makes a record month for rail shipments to the consumers, and figures already reported for the first half of June show that a still further increase is going on, which is expected to make June exceed May by a substantial tonnage. So far, this year, therefore, the mines have been surpassing previous records." The chief coal-producing states in the United States are Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois and Ohio.

FIXING THE PRICE OF COAL

On June 27th a special committee of coal operators established in Washington a permanent Bureau in co-operation with the government. It approved a proposition that coal prices during the war should be fixed by a joint governmental commission composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Defense Council's Coal Production Committee and the Federal Trade Commission. The price of coal had been steadily rising until it had reached $5.50 or $6.00 per ton. The Coal Operators Committee suggested a price at the mine of $3.00 a ton east of Pittsburgh, and $2.75 to the west. On July 1st Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, refused to accept this proposition despite the approval of other members of the government, on the ground that the price was exorbitant, and for nearly two months there was no fixed price, until on August 21st when President Wilson at the suggestion of Federal Trade Commissioner W. B. Colver fixed the price at $2.50 a ton. During this period orders for many millions of tons throughout the country were cancelled, and there was no movement of coal on the railroads. It was this delay which largely helped to cause the crisis in the following winter.

The Food and Fuel Control Law passed on August 10, 1917, authorized the creation of a Fuel Administration, and on August 23d President H. A. Garfield, of Williams College, was appointed Fuel Administrator. He was given authority to fix fuel prices, to license dealers and to punish by revocation of licenses for violation of the terms of the law, or regulations made pursuant thereto. Late in September Dr. Garfield fixed the price of coal at $2.00 a ton, which was the basic price when the coal crisis came. He also promulgated a series of regulations in connection with contracts for the sale of coal and coke. As the year went on, shortage of coal developed.

It seems to be evident that plenty of coal had been mined, and that the difficulty was caused by the shortage of cars and the general condition of congestion at terminals. Federal Trade Commissioner Colver declared the railroads alone were to blame, and John P. White, labor advisor to the National Fuel Administration, declared that there were miles and miles of loaded coal cars that were not moving,

WORKLESS MONDAYS

To relieve this congestion, on January 16, 1918, Dr. Garfield issued an order "that in all portions of the United States east of the Mississippi River on January 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d and on each Monday beginning January 28th and continuing to March 25th, inclusive, no manufacturing plant should burn fuel or use power derived from fuel, except in such plants as must be operated seven days a week to avoid serious damage, plants manufacturing perishable foods, newspaper plants and certain munition factories."

It was also ordered that on the Mondays between January 21st and March 25th, inclusive, no fuel should be burned, except enough to prevent injury to property from freezing, in any business or professional offices except those of the national, state or Federal Government or public utility companies, banks, physicians and dentists, nor was the use of fuel permitted in any stores or business houses, or in theaters or other places of amusement, or in places where liquor was sold. The order also provided that priority in shipping coal should be given to the needs of private residences, hospitals, railroads, military cantonments, public utilities, shipping for bunker purposes, manufacturers of perishable foods, and federal, state and municipal governments.

This order was widely criticized and Dr. Garfield fiercely attacked by business men and by representatives of other political parties. But it was universally obeyed. It had been approved by President Wilson. Many thousands of tons of coal were saved on each of these heatless days, and the congestion of freight was gradually relieved. Several million men and women were rendered idle and in the great majority of cases they lost their wages. The people, however, generally recognized that the close-down was necessary to the execution of war plans. Monday became virtually a holiday, theaters and places of amusement being allowed to open on that day and to close down on Tuesday instead.

To aid in this endeavor to relieve the congestion of freight, Mr. McAdoo, as Director-General of Railroads, on January 23d ordered an official embargo on all new shipments of freight, except fuel, food and a few war necessities, on the

Pennsylvania lines east of Pittsburgh, the Baltimore & Ohio lines east of the Ohio River, and the Philadelphia and Reading system. The Fuel Administration, also, undertook to control the supply of coal by the institution of a zone system in the East. Mr. J. D. A. Morrow was appointed to head a new division of the Fuel Administration to take exclusive charge of all movements of coal from producer to consumer. This new division had its representatives in every community, and by careful organization it attempted to fairly distribute the coal from the mines as fast as it could be delivered.

In the spring of 1918 the Fuel Commission took a still stronger hold on the whole situation. By proclamation of the President on the 15th of March, dealers in coal and coke were required to secure a license, and immediately thereafter rules and regulations governing the distribution of coal and coke by persons subject to license were promulgated. These regulations were very complete, and the Fuel Administration prepared to enforce them with great thoroughness. They endeavored to develop a complete coal budget indicating the probable production in 1918; the coal required for direct war work, the coal required by non-war industries, and then to develop by agreement with the non-war industries a sufficient reduction to enable the probable output of coal to supply the nation's needs. The great production of coal in the year 1918, the readiness of all purchasers to stock up early, and the reduced demand caused by the ending of the war enabled the country to conclude the following winter without shortage.

THE GASOLENE SHORTAGE

During the summer of 1918, however, a shortage began to make itself felt in the supply of gasolene on account of the heavy war demand. In a report presented to Congress on September 11, 1918, Mr. Garfield declared that there had been a daily deficit in production of 6,000 barrels since April 1st, indicating a yearly deficit of approximately 2,000,000,000 barrels. The gas stocks on the Atlantic seaport for shipment abroad were at a particularly low level.

Gasolene was a seasonal product with the maximum consumption during the period from April to September inclusive,